This is my 3rd Yale PhD Dissertation Paper, A Non-Ideal Account of Meaning Based Upon a Modified Lewisian/Hartian Account of Social Conventions.
I still have some formatting and citation to do, but the text is done!!! Woo hoo!!! Ok, I’m going to go put the finishing touches on my 2nd Dissertation Paper, Hart’s Fatal Mistake in The Concept of Law and How to Fix It.
A Non Ideal Account of Meaning Based Upon a Modified Lewisian/Hartian Account of Social Conventions
Sarah Braasch
Introduction
What does it mean for a language to be the language of that population? David Lewis argues in Convention that a language is the language of a certain population, if that population has a social convention of truthfulness in that language. This might seem intuitive, even if an idealization. Don’t we use language to align our beliefs about objects and facts in the world?
I argue that this is mistaken. We are never simply aligning our beliefs. We use language to impose our worldviews upon one another.
Social power is antecedent to linguistic meaning. The world doesn’t come to us carved at the joints. We do the carving. And, we are always carving the world into extension sets of referents and corresponding linguistic concepts. I am carving the world as I type.
Linguistic meaning is a social institution like any other social institution; linguistic meaning is a social convention; it is a step public social good. And, the assumption and conferral of practical authority is an essential feature of all social institutions/conventions (step public social goods).
This is why I use a Modified Lewisian/Hartian Account of Social Conventions as the basis for a Non-Ideal Account of Meaning. This account can accommodate our pre-theoretical intuitions that linguistic meaning evolves over time, waxing and waning, as sub social groups introduce and cease to use linguistic terms and concepts and referents. It also solves many problems in the philosophy of language.
It solves Saul Kripke’s problem of the eternal initial baptism/primitive reference. The initial baptism is an ostensive definition with a demonstrative reference, i.e., a pointing with authority. The initial baptism is rendered an identity statement between two rigid designators (the pointing and the authority), because a social group has conferred naming authority. This answers to our pre-theoretical intuitions that we use proper names and general terms as rigid designators, even for what we construe as artifact kind terms.
And, we may use proper names and general terms to refer to objects about which we may know nothing. This is the beauty of an account of reference for proper names and general terms that is a social convention to refer as a naming authority refers. (This is why I argue that linguistic competence is much more a matter of know how than know that.)
It also solves Gareth Evans’ problems with his causal description theory of reference for proper names. Every time we stand in the ostensive definition relation to an object, we make it the case that the name/general term that we use possesses indexicality. But, because the ostensive definition relation is the most intimate relation in which a speaker may stand with respect to the referent, the truth conditions of our statements never become severed from the things that we care about in the present. Using a name is bestowing a name, if I have the authority to so bestow a name.
Linguistic Meaning is a Social Institution, Therefore Social Power is Antecedent to Linguistic Meaning
What does it mean for a language to be the language of this population? In his seminal work, Convention, David Lewis argues that a language is the language of a certain population when that population has a social convention of truthfulness in that language. This may seem intuitive, if an idealization. Don’t we use language to align our beliefs about objects and facts in the world?
I argue that David Lewis is mistaken. We are never simply using language to align our beliefs about objects and facts in the world. We use language to impose our worldviews upon one another, even in the course of a single conversation.
Social power is antecedent to linguistic meaning. The world does not come to us carved at the joints; we do the carving into extension sets of referents and corresponding linguistic concepts, and, yes, even in the course of a single conversation. Ultimately, what this means is that all kinds are social kinds, including what we construe as natural kinds, with an underlying atomic structure, and what we construe as artifact kinds. This means you are a social kind. Your social group births you into existence. But, don’t worry, I leave room for you to advocate for your own existence. But, you do need to find at least one other person to confer authority upon you to name yourself.
Linguistic meaning is a social institution like any other social institution; linguistic meaning is a social convention; it is a step public social good. And, the conferral of authority is an essential feature of all social institutions/conventions (step public social goods). The nature of an object/referent or extension set of objects/referents is socially determined by a naming authority. A naming authority always assumes such authority, which is then conferred by her social group. The social group conforms to the naming social convention made salient by the naming authority.
This is why I use a Modified Lewisian/Hartian Account of Social Conventions as the basis for a Non-Ideal Account of Meaning. This account can accommodate our pre-theoretical intuitions that linguistic meaning evolves over time, waxing and waning, as sub social groups introduce and cease to use linguistic terms and concepts and referents. It also solves many problems in the philosophy of language.
This Non-Ideal Account of Meaning can accommodate all 4 essential features of reference that I outline below, including indexicality (we use proper names and general terms as rigid designators); the fact that one need not have any explicit or specific beliefs about a referent to designate that referent by using a linguistic term (linguistic competence is far more a matter of know how than know that); the evolution and devolution of naming social conventions (as mentioned immediately above); and the fact that competent speaker-members of a social group stand in the ostensive definition relation to their referents, the most intimate relation in which a speaker may stand to a referent (this makes it the case that the truth conditions of our statements never become severed from the things that we care about in our current socio-cultural context).
This Non-Ideal Account of Meaning based upon a Modified Lewisian/Hartian Account of Social Conventions solves all of the issues with existing accounts of reference for proper names and general terms, including Bertrand Russell’s and John Searle’s description theories of reference, Saul Kripke’s causal theory of reference, and Gareth Evans’ causal description theory of reference. Description theories of reference do not render proper names and general terms as rigid designators with indexicality that pick out the same referents in all possible worlds in which they designate. Kripke’s causal theory of reference cannot accommodate the evolution and devolution of linguistic meaning, because it demands a reference preserving chain of designation all the way back to the primitive reference/initial baptism. This also means that the truth conditions of a speaker’s statements end up being completely severed from anything the speaker cares about or is attempting to refer to in her present socio-cultural community. Evans attempted to improve upon Kripke with his causal description theory of reference, but he also failed to render proper names and general terms rigid designators with his reliance on the dominant source of a body of information rather than a family of descriptions. Evans did nothing more than evoke evolving social conventions to accommodate the evolution of linguistic meaning, and, unfortunately, he failed in all cases to maintain a connection between a speaker’s present concerns and the truth conditions of her statements.
A Modified Lewisian/Hartian Account of Social Conventions as the Basis for a Non-Ideal Account of Meaning
This Modified Lewisian/Hartian Account of Social Conventions defines a social convention as a Hartian system of social conventions. This system of social conventions includes a primary, duty-imposing social convention of obligation (or quasi obligation) and a secondary power-conferring social convention of authority. This is Hart’s legal system from The Concept of Law, but modified. For Hart, legal rules are legal rules, because they are part of a system of social rules; however, Hart was actually giving an account of social conventions. The social conventions that comprise this system of social conventions are Lewisian social conventions, in that this is David Lewis’ game theoretic, rational choice-based account of social conventions from his seminal work, Convention, but modified.
Why modified? Both Lewis and Hart were trying to capture what they construed as an essential feature of social conventions, their obligatory character. But, both Lewis and Hart appreciated that they had only an individual, instrumental (means-ends) rationality with which to work. This led both men to devise accounts of social conventions that are Lewisian social conventions, in that there is a single rational thing to do, which is what everyone else in one’s social group is doing. If there is a single rational thing to do, then you have something approaching an obligation or quasi-obligation to do that one rational thing. Both Lewis and Hart demand unanimity in preference for, expectation of, and actual conformity, in order to generate obligatoriness.
But, Lewisian social conventions only arise in situations wherein everyone in a population is particularly motivated to align their beliefs and expectations with one another. No unilateral deviation may be tolerated, because everyone fares far worse, if even a single social group member fails to conform. This means that Lewisian social conventions are severely constrained. They must pop into and out of existence, and they cannot evolve or devolve, nor do they allow for dissent or disagreement or pluralism. This is because of the risk dominance of the status quo position. No one party to a Lewisian social convention is going to jump to an alternate social convention, unless she is certain that her entire social group will jump with her. But, we have pre-theoretical intuitions that our social conventions wax and wane over time, arising in a population, evolving and devolving, and, eventually, collapsing. We have pre-theoretical intuitions that people disagree about what the law is and should be.
There are 3 steps to modifying Lewis’ and Hart’s accounts of social conventions to allow for evolution and devolution, disagreement and dissent, and pluralism. Step 1 is to acknowledge Margaret Gilbert’s insight that social conventions are social group constituting. A population that has a social convention is a social group for that reason alone, if for no other. Step 2 is to acknowledge the role that practical authority plays. Practical authority solves the problem of the risk dominance of the status quo position, because a practical authority makes known how everyone in a social group will behave. The account of authority employed is that of legal philosopher Joseph Raz. To have authority over someone is to have the power or capacity to alter their protected reasons, and a protected reason is a reason to do something and not to consider any alternate actions. A last important point is that authority is always assumed, then conferred, but the risk-tolerant, fore-sighted persons required to assume such authority may be few and far between. Social coordination problems often go unsolved.
Step 3 is acknowledging that social institutions/conventions are step public social goods. The moment that the social good that is the constitution of the social group itself is generated, the social group resides upon an equilibrium point. This is because the practical authority is a free riding defector, a member of the social group, but not party to the social convention. Fortunately, Lewis allowed for negligible deviation in Convention. At the equilibrium point, no one party to the social convention has any incentive to deviate, because the social group would collapse back to the status quo. And, the practical authority/freeriding defector has no incentive to conform to the social convention, because they fare far better by freeriding. Thus, everyone who is party to the social convention has something approaching obligation to continue conforming, but we have severed the necessary connection between unanimity of conformity and obligatoriness.
We can now have sub social groups with sub social institutions/conventions that wax and wane over time. We can have disagreement and dissent and pluralism. The game theoretic concepts of the Core and the Shapley Value define when a sub social institution/convention becomes the social institution/convention of the entire social group. A social institution becomes a legal institution when the authority that is conferred by the social group or sub social group is conferred upon public officials qua public officials.
This is the game theoretic, rational choice-based formal definition of a Modified Lewisian/Hartian Account of Social Conventions:
First, the formal definition of the primary, duty-imposing social conventions of obligation (or quasi-obligation):
A regularity R in the behavior of members of a population P when they are agents in a recurrent situation S is a convention if and only if it is true that, and it is common knowledge in P that, in almost any instance of S among members of P,
- a minimum threshold level of or more members of P conforms to R;
- a minimum threshold level of or more members of P expects a minimum threshold level of or more members of P to conform to R;
- almost everyone has approximately the same preferences regarding R and R’;
- a minimum threshold level of or more members of P prefers to conform to R, on condition that a minimum threshold level of or more members of P conforms to R;
- a minimum threshold level of or more members of P would prefer to conform to R’, on condition that a minimum threshold level of or more members of P conforms to R’,
where R’ is some possible regularity in the behavior of members of P in S, such that almost no one in almost any instance of S among members of P could conform both to R’ and to R.
This also translates into the following formal definition for the secondary, power-conferring social conventions of authority:
The identification of a practical authority to make salient the solution to a primary duty imposing coordination problem of obligation, R, by members of a population P when they are agents in a primary duty imposing coordination problem of obligation is a convention if and only if it is true that, and it is common knowledge in P that, when such practical authority, R, is assumed, then:
- almost everyone conforms to R;
- almost everyone expects almost everyone else to conform to R;
- almost everyone has approximately the same preferences regarding all possible combinations of actions;
- almost everyone prefers that any one more conform to R, on condition that almost everyone conform to R;
- almost everyone would prefer that any one more conform to R’, on condition that almost everyone conform to R’,
where R’ is some possible identification of a practical authority (or none) by members of P in S, such that almost no one in almost any instance of S among members of P could conform both to R’ and to R.
The simultaneous existence of these two social conventions, one primary and duty imposing, the other secondary and power conferring, in union, is the formal definition of a Modified Lewisian/Hartian Account of a Social Convention.
The Meaning, and Two Senses, of Meaning
I argue that linguistic meaning retains the sense/reference ambiguity, or, rather, distinction. It is not ambiguous. There are two senses of the term ‘meaning.’ One sense of the term ‘meaning’ is reference, which is the extension set of objects/entities of which the term is true; the other sense of the term ‘meaning’ is linguistic concept, which is something similar to Hilary Putnam’s stereotype, i.e., a linguistic concept is a set of characteristics, superficial or no, associated with an ostensible paradigmatic example of the objects in the extension set of the term in question. The term ‘elm’ refers to the extension set of all elm trees. There is a sense of the meaning of the term ‘elm’ that is this extension set of all elm trees. The linguistic concept associated with the term ‘elm’ is that of a deciduous tree common to North America. There is a sense of the meaning of the term ‘elm’ that is a deciduous tree common to North America. Neither the intension (understood as linguistic concept) nor the mental state of an individual speaker determines the extension of the term ‘elm,’ or any general term, be it a natural or artifact kind term. As Putnam made clear in the “Meaning of Meaning,” both our linguistic concept associated with the term ‘elm,’ which he would have understood as the stereotype of an elm tree, and the conception of an elm tree possessed by any ordinary, non-expert English speaker, are too impoverished to possibly determine the extension set (the referent) of the term ‘elm.’ The nature (which is socially determined) of the objects in the extension set of a term defines the boundaries and content of the extension set. Neither the linguistic concept associated with a term, nor a conception (mental state) that an individual speaker associates with a term, necessarily picks out the nature of the objects in the extension set of the same term.
The One Sense of Meaning: Reference
Let’s begin with reference, with the referent of a general term (or a proper name). No vocalization or utterance that a human being might make is imbued with natural meaning, in Paul Grice’s sense of natural meaning (e.g., smoke means fire). In other words, there is nothing salient about using this or that morpheme or term to refer to some object/entity or set of objects/entities. This means that we have a coordination game wherein a social group of human beings would prefer to use the same term to refer to an object or set of objects rather than use different terms to refer to the object (or set of objects). Let’s imagine that this is a scenario which may give rise to a Lewisian social convention (a solution to a pure coordination game that is one of at least two proper coordination equilibrium points), because the members of the social group are particularly motivated to align their beliefs and expectations with one another. Let’s imagine that the social group is trying to coordinate upon a general term to refer to a particularly dangerous set of predators, tigers. (I take issue with Brian Skyrms’s use of the replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory as the way in which social conventions arise in human populations, because this simply cannot account for the way in which the terms of human natural languages are wholly lacking in natural meaning.)
I argue that, in order to solve the coordination problem, a secondary power conferring social convention of authority arises, out of necessity. The solution to this secondary power conferring social convention is to identify as the naming authority whomever assumes such authority. The person who assumes the authority to make salient the primary duty imposing social convention upon which the social group will converge will have such authority conferred upon her, authority constrained by the proper coordination equilibrium points (the regularities in behavior) that the social group does or will accept.
There are 4 essential features of reference for proper names and general terms. At least 1 or more of these essential features have proven themselves to be stumbling blocks to extant theories of reference, including Bertrand Russell’s and John Searle’s description theories of reference; Saul Kripke’s causal theory of reference; and Gareth Evans’ causal description theory of reference. I explain below how a Non-Ideal Account of Meaning based upon a Modified Lewisian/Hartian Account of Social Conventions accommodates all 4 of these essential features of reference for proper names and general terms, and solves many issues present in other accounts of reference.
1 – We use proper names and general terms as rigid designators. They possess indexicality. They pick out the same referent in all possible worlds.
2 – We need not have any explicit beliefs about a reference. We are still able to competently use a linguistic term, by conforming to the social convention of referring as our social group’s naming authority refers.
3 – Linguistic meaning, in the sense of reference, evolves over time, waxing and waning as social groups introduce and cease using linguistic terms and referents.
4 – We stand in the ostensive definition relation to a referent, the most intimate relation between speaker and referent, so the truth conditions of our statements never become severed from the things that we care about in our current socio-cultural communities and context.
There is more to explain about how exactly an authority renders a proper name or general term the name of an object/referent or a set of objects/entities. The initial baptism/primitive reference, as Saul Kripke refers to it in Naming and Necessity, is an ostensive definition with a demonstrative reference. The naming authority points, either literally or figuratively, to a paradigmatic example of a set of objects, or, in the case of a proper name, to the object/entity itself. The naming authority could say something to the effect of, “I hereby bestow the name ‘tiger’ upon the set of objects with the same nature as this object.” The claim of naming authority could be implicit. The claim of using the one object as a paradigmatic example of all objects with the same nature could be implicit. What is important is that the naming (the baptism/primitive reference) be an identity statement between two rigid designators.
As Kripke points out in Naming and Necessity, an identity statement between two rigid designators, if true, is necessarily true; it is true in all possible worlds. This is what renders either the general term or the proper name a rigid designator; this is what imbues the term with indexicality. The one rigid designator, on the one side of the identity statement is the indexical ‘I,’ which refers to the naming authority; the other rigid designator is the demonstrative ‘that.’ The identity statement between two rigid designators will be true, if it is the case that the person doing the naming has the authority to so name. This naming authority is bestowed by the community of speakers. And, if such authority has been bestowed, because the community of speakers has adopted (converged upon) the social convention of referring to some object or set of objects by the proper name or general term that the naming authority has given it (made salient), then the identity statement between two rigid designators is true. And, thus, since it is true, it is necessarily true; it is true in all possible worlds. This is what imbues proper names and general terms with indexicality; this is what renders proper names and general terms rigid designators.
There is more to be said, but this account of reference for proper names and general terms already answers to many of our pre theoretical notions of how we use proper names and general terms in natural language. I am, of course, rejecting description theories of reference, e.g., Bertrand Russell’s and John Searle’s. I will address below the role that descriptions do play. I am relying heavily here on Kripke’s Naming and Necessity and Putnam’s “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’.” We use proper names and general terms as rigid designators. When I refer to Socrates, I mean to refer to that man in the actual world upon whom the name ‘Socrates’ has been bestowed, and in a counterfactual world in which Socrates did none of the things for which he is famous in the actual world, I would still mean to refer to that man and not someone else who had done all of those things. As Putnam makes clear, we also use general terms in natural language as rigid designators, even for what we construe as artifact kind terms. When I use the word ‘pencil,’ I mean to refer to the set of objects with the same nature as the local pencils, and if it turns out to be the case that what the inhabitants of some other possible world refer to as ‘pencils’ are in fact living organisms, then I would say that those objects aren’t in fact pencils, because my local pencils aren’t living organisms.
And, we may use proper names and general terms to refer to objects and sets of objects about which we may know nothing, or next to nothing, or false next to nothings. I may have no idea that Socrates was a gadfly or corrupted the youth of Athens or killed himself by drinking hemlock, but I’m still able to use the name ‘Socrates’ to refer to Socrates. The same can be said of our use of general terms. I can use the general term ‘elm’ to refer to elm trees, even if I know next to nothing about elm trees. This is the beauty of an account of reference for proper names and general terms that is a social convention to refer as a naming authority refers, and the naming authority refers by giving an ostensive definition with a demonstrative reference.
Additionally, we have the pre theoretical intuition that the references of our proper names and general terms evolve. This is also the beauty of an account of reference based upon a Modified Lewisian/Hartian Account of Social Conventions. Linguistic meaning is a social institution (a step public social good), and, like all social institutions, it can evolve and devolve over time, according to the account of the evolution and devolution of social conventions above.
It is a good thing that Lewis allowed for negligible unilateral deviation in his account of social conventions, because, with respect to Lewisian social conventions, as per the naming of tigers scenario illustrated above, Lewisian social conventions are still step public social goods with a naming authority. It must be the case that there is at least one person with the naming authority to make salient one or another social convention, and it must be the case that this person is unconstrained by social obligation. If this person were constrained by social obligation, then she would not be in a position to assume the authority to choose to make salient the one or another social convention. She would not be an authority in that case; she would not have the power to change the protected reasons of the members of her social group. This is why Lewisian social conventions are also step public social goods.
The freeriding practical authority in a social group who is not party to the social convention also preserves the essential feature of social conventions that is arbitrariness. If it were not the case that a social group could jump to an alternate social convention, especially in the case of a Lewisian social convention, if they were motivated to do so, then their behavior would not be conventional behavior, because it would not be arbitrary. Additionally, the existence of a freeriding practical authority makes it the case that devolution of a social convention in a social group is possible, i.e., a social group could jump from a more optimal Lewisian social convention to a less optimal social convention. This would not otherwise be considered rational behavior.
I will give an example of how linguistic reference evolves and devolves over time below, but, as Gareth Evans so insightfully pointed out in “The Causal Theory of Names,” it is a major disadvantage of Kripke’s causal theory of reference that reference cannot evolve over time. Kripke requires that there exists an unbroken reference preserving chain of references from one speaker to another all the way back to the initial baptism / primitive reference. As Evans makes clear, this is problematic, because the truth conditions of your statements end up having nothing whatsoever to do with the things that you believe and care about and about which you are speaking in your current sociocultural context.
Evans argues for a causal description theory of reference for proper names. Evans argues that the causal relationship within which we stand to the references of our proper names is that the reference of a proper name we might use is the primary source of the body of information that we possess. And, Evans asserts that the source of a body of information can evolve over time, because it is the source of the body of information that we possess as a social group, and, yet, Evans argues, the proper name acts as a rigid designator, because no one else could have been the dominant source of the body of information. Evans is himself not completely clear as to how the evolution of the reference takes place, other than the fact that he invokes evolving social conventions.
Evans is right about the need to provide an account of reference for proper names and general terms that evolves over time, and he is right to invoke evolving social conventions. However, his causal description theory of reference fails to render proper names as rigid designators, because it’s not the case that the dominant source of a body of information picks out the same person in all possible worlds any more than a family of descriptions does.
I offer the example of Jonah from the Bible. In the actual world, there was an actual Prophet Jonah who is the dominant source of the body of information, even though it is conceded that he did none of the things which are ascribed to him in the Bible. However, in a counterfactual world in which someone had actually accomplished all of the feats ascribed to the Prophet Jonah, that person would be the dominant source of that body of information, not the Prophet Jonah.
Additionally, I argue that Evans fails at aligning the truth conditions of our statements, including proper names, with the things that we care about and are interested in in our current sociocultural context in all cases. I argue that there is a causal relation that is more intimate, a causal relation that ensures that we always align the truth conditions of our statements with the things that we are interested in and care about in our current sociocultural context, even when Evans’s causal relation fails. And, this causal relation is the ostensive definition relation.
I argue that we stand in the ostensive definition relation to the referents of the proper names and general terms that we use in natural language. This means that when we use a proper name or a general term, that we are, in fact, bestowing that name upon that referent (be it a singular object or a set of objects/entities). An individual conforms to the social convention, made salient by her social group’s naming authority, of using a particular proper name or general term to refer to some object or set of objects. Of course, the naming by the naming authority is an ostensive definition with a demonstrative reference. This naming authority has such authority to name conferred upon her by her social group. An individual speaker wears the mantle of the naming authority’s authority to name, when she conforms to her social group’s social convention to so name. When social group members so conform to this social convention, they stand in the ostensive definition relation to whichever object/set of objects.
They make it the case that the name/general term that they use possesses indexicality (is a rigid designator). It is unnecessary that anyone possesses any specific or explicit beliefs about the referent; they need only confer authority to the naming authority and conform to the social convention made salient by the naming authority. And, since it is a social convention (a step public social good/social institution), it is the case that the referent can evolve and devolve over time. But, because the ostensive definition relation is the most intimate relation in which a speaker may stand with respect to the referent, we can be assured that the truth conditions of our statements never become severed from the things that we care about in the present. Using a name is bestowing a name, if I have the authority to so bestow a name.
So, I hope it is clear that social power, the conferral of naming authority precedes linguistic meaning. We carve up the world; the world does not come to us carved at the joints. We determine which essential features of some objects define the boundaries of the extension set to which we are referring. This nature might be some intrinsic, inherent underlying structure, as is the case for natural kinds. This nature might be some set of superficial characteristics, as is the case for artifact kinds. However, the nature of the objects that defines the boundary of a particular extension set is socially determined. It is determined by the naming authority. What this means is that extensions evolve over time, even the extension sets of natural kind terms.
So, in Archimedes’ time, the extension set of the term ‘gold’ was defined by the nature of gold, but the nature of gold, which was socially determined, was defined by a set of superficial characteristics. So, in Archimedes’ time, fools’ gold was included in the extension set of the term ‘gold.’ Of course, now, fools’ gold is not included in the extension set of the term ‘ gold.’ But, contrary to what Putnam asserts, this does not demand that I reject truth and extension. Extension sets are picked out according to a nature defined by an authority, and it is true that the general term/name bestowed upon this extension set is the name of this extension set, if the person bestowing the name has the authority to do so. This makes it the case that all kinds are social kinds, be they what we currently refer to as natural or artifact kinds.
What Role is Left for Descriptions in a Non-Ideal Account of Meaning Based Upon a Modified Lewisian/Hartian Account of Social Conventions?
What role is left for descriptions in this account of reference for proper names and general terms? I agree with Kripke, and I agree with Putnam where he agrees with Kripke, that there is little role left for descriptions in an account of reference. Reference is an ostensive definition with a demonstrative reference. Reference is, essentially, and in the simplest terms, a pointing with authority.
However, descriptions can prove quite useful. Descriptions are useful, because we can use descriptions to make clear to our social groups to which extension sets we are referring. We can actually use descriptions to point figuratively. Kripke calls this using a description to pick out a reference, to make clear to what exactly one is referring in the actual world during the primitive reference, but Kripke also makes clear that this is absolutely not making the name synonymous with the description. We also use descriptions as the proclamation to the social group, so that everyone in the social group knows to what exactly the naming authority is referring. We also use descriptions as official documentation of the naming, much akin to birth and baptismal certificates. And, just as is the case with birth certificates, we make certain persons and groups of persons in the community of speakers the keepers of this knowledge. This is yet another social convention; this is yet a different kind of authority that is conferred. And, because of this, it is not necessary for anyone else in the social group to have any specific or explicit beliefs about the referents of our proper names or general terms. If need be, we can refer to these authorities who are the keepers of this knowledge.
When a Naming Social Convention of a Sub Social Group Becomes the Social Convention of the Entire Social Group
We can also think about how reference becomes a social institution of a sub social group, and how reference becomes a social, or even legal, institution of the entire social group. Reference is a social institution/convention. All members of a social group may assume naming authority to introduce new words into a language and to cease using certain words, naming authority which may or may not be subsequently conferred by a sub social group. I will argue that some naming, in particular with respect to proper names, is a legal institution of the entire social group, of course, even if such a social group tolerates nicknames or stage names, etc., within sub social groups.
With respect to persons living in our current social communities, this is the case. And, this is because the authority has been conferred upon a public official qua public official, i.e., in their official public capacity. It is particularly important that we align our beliefs and expectations with respect to naming and identifying the persons who are living in our current communities for a whole slew of reasons. So, we are intolerant of unilateral deviation. In these instances, we can only jump to an alternate naming convention for a particular person en masse, as a group, instantaneously and simultaneously. This is why you have to change your name legally.
But, in speaking to how linguistic meaning is a social institution (a social convention/step public social good) that evolves and devolves over time, we can determine the point at which a particular reference becomes a social institution for the entire social group, rather than for merely a sub social group. And, we can employ the cooperative game theoretic concepts of the Core and Shapley value here. The point at which the grand coalition (including freeriding defectors who are authorities and non-authorities) enters the Core is the point at which the particular referent is a social institution for the entire social group. What is particularly interesting about this is that you can think of this project as giving a precise mathematical game theoretic account of natural language ontology. Natural language ontologists, like Frederike Moltmann, give intuitive answers for when the extension set of a term is in the core of a natural language ontology and when it is in the periphery. This non-ideal account of reference, based upon a modified Lewisian/Hartian account of social conventions, is a way of giving a precise, quantitative answer to this question.
The Other Sense of Meaning: Linguistic Concepts
Let’s speak to the other sense of the term ‘meaning.’ How do linguistic concepts arise and evolve and devolve, and what are linguistic concepts exactly? I argue that the linguistic concept associated with a term arises at the same point as does the reference/extension of the term. A linguistic concept is what Putnam refers to as a stereotype. A linguistic concept is a set of characteristics, either superficial or intrinsic, associated with an ostensible paradigmatic example of the objects in the extension set associated with a term. A linguistic concept is a social convention (it is a social institution/a step public social good). A linguistic concept associated with a term often co-evolves along with the extension set of that term, but they can come apart.
When the naming social convention arises, the social convention made salient by the naming authority during the primitive reference/initial baptism, the naming authority proclaims the essential features that define the boundaries of the extension set of the referent. This is the birth of the linguistic concept associated with a term. These proclaimed essential features, either intrinsic or superficial, are the linguistic concept; they are Putnam’s stereotype. A secondary power conferring social convention of authority arises as well, to identify the keepers of this knowledge, i.e., the keepers of these linguistic concepts.
Just as is the case for the referent associated with a term, the linguistic concept associated with a term evolves over time. Often, if the extension set associated with a term evolves, so that the boundaries of the extension set, i.e., the nature of the objects within the extension set, is determined according to some intrinsic, inherent underlying structure, rather than a set of superficial characteristics, it will be the case that the linguistic concept associated with the term continues to be the set of superficial (sometimes very minimal) characteristics. We find this to be the case regarding the term ‘elm.’ When we use the term ‘elm,’ we refer to the extension set of elm trees, per the intrinsic underlying structure of elm trees. But, when we use the term ‘elm,’ we (generally speaking) mean the shared linguistic concept of a common deciduous tree found in North America. Our linguistic concept and our referent associated with the term ‘elm’ have come apart. This is not the case with respect to the term ‘water.’ I argue that our linguistic concept associated with the term ‘water’ is H2O, and the socially determined nature that defines the boundaries of the extension set associated with the term ‘water’ is also H2O.
Putnam argues that, in order to be considered a competent speaker in a given natural language, it is linguistically obligatory to know, in the sense of know that, the linguistic concept (stereotype) associated with a term. I argue that this is not the case. Just as we can use terms to refer as our communities use them to refer, we can use terms to mean (in the sense of linguistic concept) what our communities use them to mean, without having any specific or explicit beliefs about the linguistic concept in question.
I employ the example of the blind gemologist. Consider the term ‘jade.’ There are two different types of gemstone within the extension set of the term ‘jade.’ There is nephrite and jadeite. These two different gemstones have different atomic structures. I argue that the linguistic concept associated with the term ‘jade’ is a pale green gemstone found in Asia. Imagine a blind gemologist who has no conception of the term ‘green.’ Therefore, she can’t have any conception of the linguistic concept associated with the term ‘jade.’ But, the blind gemologist can still conform to the social convention, which is to use the term ‘jade’ to mean, in the sense of linguistic concept, a pale green gemstone found in Asia. The blind gemologist means what her community means, in the sense of linguistic concept, when she uses the term ‘jade.’ The blind gemologist can still confer authority upon the keepers of this linguistic concept in her social group. Again, this is why I regard linguistic competence as much more a matter of know how (to confer authority and conform) than know that, which entails having explicit and specific beliefs.
Moreover, as an expert in gemstones, imagine that the blind gemologist introduces the linguistic concept that is whatever the underlying atomic structures of nephrite and jadeite are for the term ‘ jade.’ Imagine that she influences a large number of persons in her community. Imagine that she establishes herself as a naming authority and/or keeper of linguistic concepts in her sub social group. This sub social group has a social institution of using the linguistic concept (that is the underlying atomic structures of nephrite and jadeite) for the term ‘ jade.’ I would argue that the blind gemologist knows the meaning, in the sense of linguistic concept, of the term ‘jade.’ I would argue that she is fully linguistically and semantically competent, even if she does not know the linguistic concept for the term ‘jade’ for the entire social group. Therefore, it cannot be linguistically obligatory to know, in the sense of know that, the linguistic concept associated with a term.
What about abstract objects? Or fictional entities? I argue that the referents of abstract and fictional kind terms are the social conventions that are the linguistic concepts associated with these terms. The referent of the term ‘Superman’ is the social institution that is the linguistic concept associated with the term ‘Superman.’
Implications for Necessary Truth
There are no a posteriori necessary truths. Unfortunately, Kripke is wrong about this. And, so is Putnam. Since it is always the case that a naming authority carves up the world via ostensive definitions with demonstrative references, it is never the case that there are necessary truths that are epistemically contingent. We may discover that there are some different atomic structures in the world, but we choose to say that we’re going to use an atomic structure to define the nature of some objects/entities that lie in an extension set, to define the boundaries of an extension set associated with a term. However, there are a posteriori contingent truths. The superficial characteristics of the objects/entities in an extension set may vary wildly, and the socially determined nature of the objects in an extension set may reveal nothing about the superficial characteristics of those objects. Also, biological evolution is constantly in effect.
Carving up the world according to socially determined natures demands that there are a priori truths that are both necessary and contingent. Naming a certain length of a certain bar in Paris ‘one meter’ is an a priori truth. I have no need to investigate the world. It is true by definition. And, it is a metaphysically necessary truth, because the name ‘one meter’ picks out the same length in all possible worlds in which it designates. But, it is also contingent, because the naming authority could have chosen otherwise. She could have chosen some other length as one meter. The fact that the term ‘one meter’ refers to the length that it does is a first order necessary truth and a second order contingent truth.
Speech Act Theory is Superfluous
All performatives, either implicit or explicit, are actually real time, self-referential constative/indicative statements. When I name something, I am exercising my authority to carve up the world. My statement is true, if I have the authority to do so. My community of speakers grants me this authority. So, the truth conditions of my statements are determined by my community of speakers. There is no illocutionary meaning. All meaning is locutionary meaning. Perlocutionary meaning is also subsumed by locutionary meaning. If your sub social group confers authority upon you, then they will adopt the naming convention that you have made salient. This is part of what it means for your real time self referential constative/indicative statement to be true. All assertions are exercises of authority; they are attempts to carve up the world. And, these statements are true if your community of speakers confers such authority upon you. (I also argue that there are implications of this account for pragmatics. Conversation is not a matter of aligning mutual beliefs. We converse with one another in order to impose our worldviews upon one another.)
Thinking that there are locutionary meanings of statements and illocutionary/perlocutionary meanings of statements is a mistake. It is not the case that words mean one thing and what we do with these words is something else, that what we do with words makes them mean something else, but in such a way that there are no truth conditions. This is wrong. This is simply failing to understand that linguistic meaning is a social institution/convention that evolves. This is simply failing to understand that there can be a social institution for the entire social group, a social institution that is stable, and, at the same time, there can exist a sub social group constituted by a sub social institution/convention.
All Kinds are Social Kinds, Including You (You Are a Social Kind)
There are feminist metaphysicians and social ontologists, including Judith Butler, who argue that your existence as a social kind is determined by your community of speakers. I argue that this is the case. You don’t exist, you don’t have the authority to refer to yourself and to assert statements about yourself with the indexical ‘I,’ unless your community of speakers grants you such authority. Your social group births you into existence. Nonetheless, I leave room for activism; I leave room for the assumption of authority. So, you are able to advocate on behalf of your own existence. I make it the case that you can assert your own existence. Some feminist metaphysics denies this possibility. But, you still have to get at least one other person in your social group to confer this authority upon you. Otherwise, you don’t exist. All kinds are social kinds, and you are a social kind. You are part of the world, and the way in which the world gets carved up is socially determined.
Linguistic (and Semantic) Competence is a Matter of Know How, Not Know That
This account allows for the possibility that a member (or many members) of a social groupa community of speakers could use terms to refer and could use terms to mean shared linguistic concepts without possessing any specific or explicit beliefs about the referent or the linguistic concept. This person could be referring as their social group refers; this person could be using a term to mean what their social group means. In order to allow for the evolution and devolution of reference and meaning, we have to lower the bar on what we require speakers in a community to know, in the sense of know that, in order to count as linguistically and semantically competent. I argue that someone can use terms in a perfectly linguistically and semantically competent way by conferring authority and conforming to the social conventions made salient by the naming authority, without having any explicit beliefs about the referents or linguistic concepts. I rely upon Jason Stanley’s work on know how. Linguistic and semantic competence is far more a matter of know how than know that.
Conclusion
Herein I have given a Non-Ideal Account of Meaning based upon a Modified Lewisian/Hartian Account of Social Conventions. I have given a formal game theoretic, rational-choice based definition of a Modified Lewisian/Hartian Account of Social Conventions. We need a non-deal account of meaning, because linguistic meaning, in both senses, i.e., reference and linguistic concept, is a social institution, and a social institution is an evolving social convention; it’s a step public social good of a sub social group. Social power is antecedent to linguistic meaning. We are the ones that carve up the world, even in the course of a single conversation between two persons.
This Non-Ideal Account of Meaning based upon a Modified Lewisian/Hartian Account of Social Conventions can accommodate all 4 of the essential features of reference outlined above: indexicality, evolution and devolution, know how rather than know that, and the ostensive definition relation. This account solves many issues in existing theories of reference that cannot accommodate all 4 essential features of reference outlined above. This includes Russell’s and Searle’s description theories of reference, Kripke’s causal theory of reference, and Evans’ causal description theory of reference.
Future work includes an empirical social psychological study on the nature of authority and legitimacy and the relationship between the two. Future work also includes an agent-based computational model and simulations of how social institutions, including linguistic meaning, i.e., social conventions/step public social goods, arise in a population, evolve and devolve, and, eventually, collapse. The model and simulations will also include the way in which individual quasi-rational agents intentionally pressure the evolution and devolution of their social institutions.
Work Cited
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Butler, J., 1990, “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution”, in Performing Feminisms, S-E. Case (ed.), Baltimore: John Hopkins University.
Evans, G., 1982, The Varieties of Reference, Oxford : Clarendon Press.
Evans, Gareth & J.E.J. Altham, 1973, “The Causal Theory of Names,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes Vol. 47 (1973), pp. 187-225.
Gilbert, Margaret, 1989. On Social Facts, New York: Routledge.
Gilbert, Margaret, 2008. “Social Convention Revisited,” Topoi, 27: 5–16.
Grice, Herbert Paul, 1957, “Meaning”, The Philosophical Review, 66: 377–88.
Hart, H.L.A., 2012, The Concept of Law, 3rd edition (first edition 1961), Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Kripke, S., 1972, “Naming and Necessity”, in Davidson and Harman 1972, 253–355, 763–769. Reprinted later as: 1980, Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Blackwell.
Lewis, David, 1969. Convention, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Moltmann, Frederike, 2013. Abstract Objects and the Semantics of Natural Language, Oxford University Press.
Putnam, Hillary, 1973, “Meaning, Reference and Stereotypes”, Journal of Philosophy, 70: 699–711.
Putnam, Hillary, 1975, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, in Mind, Language and Reality, Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ranehill, Eva, Schneider, Frédéric, & Weber, Roberto, “The unrealized value of centralization for coordination” (unpublished manuscript dated January 1, 2017 received from authors).
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Raz, Joseph, 1990, Practical Reason and Norms, 2nd ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Searle, John, 1969. Speech Acts, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Skyrms, Brian, 1996. Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Skyrms, B. (2004). The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stanley, Jason, 2011, Know How, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ward, Hugh, 1990, “Three Men in a Boat, Two Must Row: An Analysis of a Three-Person Chicken Pregame”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 34, Issue 3, pp. 371 – 400.
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